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The controversy over the old ideal of “value-free science” has cooled significantly
over the past decade. Many philosophers of science now agree that even ethical and
political values may play a substantial role in all aspects of scientific inquiry. Conse-
quently, in the last few years, work in science and values has become more specific:
Which values may influence science, and in which ways? Or, how do we distinguish
illegitimate from illegitimate kinds of influence? In this paper, I argue that this problem
requires philosophers of science to take a new direction. I present two case studies in the
influence of values on scientific inquiry: feminist values in archaeology and commercial
values in pharmaceutical research. I offer a preliminary assessment of these cases, that
the influence of values was legitimate in the feminist case, but not in the pharmaceutical
case. I then turn to three major approaches to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate in-
fluences of values, including the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values
and Heather Douglas’ distinction between direct and indirect roles for values. I argue
that none of these three approaches gives an adequate analysis of the two cases. In
the concluding section, I briefly sketch my own approach, which draws more heavily on
ethics than the others, and is more promising as a solution to the current problem. This
is the new direction in which I think science and values should move.
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The controversy over the ideal of “value-free science,” while not completely settled
(for a recent salvo, see Betz 2013), has cooled significantly over the past decade. Many
philosophers of science, and perhaps most specialists in the role of values in science,
now agree that even ethical and political values may play a substantial role in all aspects
of scientific inquiry, including the evaluation and acceptance of hypotheses. In addition,
almost no philosophers have ever been attracted to the “anything-goes” relativism that
was the primary rhetorical foil to the value-free ideal during the so-called Science Wars.
Philosophers generally accept some constraints on the kinds of values that may influence
science, or the ways in which they may have an influence. Consequently, in the last few
years, work in science and values has become more specific: Granted that at least some
values may influence science, in at least some ways, which values may do so, and in
which ways? Or, to put it slightly differently, how do we distinguish cases in which the
influence of values is legitimate from cases in which it is illegitimate?
In this paper, I argue that addressing these questions requires philosophy of science
to take a new direction. After replacing talk of “the value-free ideal” with more precise
language, in §2 I present two cases in which ethical and political values had a significant
influence on science. One case deals with the influence of feminist values in archaeology;
the other case deals with the influence of commercial values in pharmaceutical research.
I sketch an analysis of these cases, which indicates that the influence of values was
legitimate in the feminist case, but illegitimate in the pharmaceutical. This preliminary
judgment is of course incompatible with both the value-free ideal and an “anything-goes”
view. In recent work, philosophers have tried to analyze these kinds of cases using tools
developed in the earlier debates over the value-free ideal. In §§3-5, I review three such
sets of tools and three such analyses. In each case, I argue that the analysis is inadequate.
Roughly, either the analysis is incompatible with the preliminary judgment about the
two cases (e.g., it concludes that the influence of feminist values was illegitimate), or
it relies on a problematic assumption about the value of the pursuit of truth.1 In §6 I
1. I am not interested in the scientific realism vs. antirealism debate here, or the nature of truth as
such. Rather, my interest is in our attitudes towards truth, the ways in which we pursue it, and how these
pursuits relate to other activities. That is, I’m interested in these relational properties of truth rather than
A NEW DIRECTION FOR SCIENCE AND VALUES 3
develop my own approach, which draws heavily on resources in ethics and accounts of
practical reason. This is the “new direction” of the title: philosophers of science should
undertake a deeper engagement with ethics, which will enable us to bring together both
epistemological and ethical considerations.
To this point, I have spoken loosely of “the value-free ideal” and “the influence of
values.” In the remainder of this introduction, I lay out more precise language and review
some major developments in the science and values literature over the past decade. (The
presentation below is heavily indebted to Hugh Lacey’s discussion of these issues.)
It is common to divide the activity of scientific inquiry into several “contexts,”
“moments,” “steps,” or “phases” (for examples from the science and values literature,
see Anderson 2004, 6-7; Lacey 2005a; 2005b, §3.4; Douglas 2009, 88ff; K. Elliott 2011,
chapter 3; Kitcher 2011, 31ff, 2013; Brown 2013c, 2). While the details of these taxonomies
vary widely, all are compatible with a coarse division along the following lines:
(1) A pre-epistemic phase, during which research programs are chosen, hypotheses are
formulated, and experiments are designed and conducted.2
its intrinsic properties. Throughout this paper, I generally use “truth” as a generic term for the epistemic
aim or aims of scientific inquiry, especially when and insofar as these are “purely epistemic,” that is,
independent of or contrasting with the aims of “applied science” and engineering.
Truth in the sense usually connected to scientific realism is one such aim, but other such aims include
Bas van Fraassen’s empirical adequacy (1980) and Michael Friedman’s communicative rationality (2001).
Daniel Steel seems to use “truth” in something like the narrower, scientific realist sense, and so when I
discuss his views in §4 I follow his lead; however, little or nothing in the argument of that section turns on
the nature of truth or scientific realism vs. antirealism. Truth in the Deweyan sense of “effectively resolves
the current problematic situation” is not covered by “truth” as I use it there, since this sense of “truth”
ties it closely to the pragmatic, not “purely epistemic” aims of “applied science” and engineering (Brown
2012).
Throughout this paper, I speak of truth “as a value,” and discuss how this value relates to ethical and
political values. Again, my interest is in our attitude towards truth — how we value it — and how this
relates to other things that we value. Speaking of truth in this way does not imply that it is “merely” a
value, that truth as such is entirely subjective, and so on. Indeed, presumably we value truth (in any of the
senses given in the last paragraph) because it is not entirely subjective. Talking about truth as a value is
entirely consistent with taking truth or some necessary condition for truth to be a necessary condition for
accepting a theory. For instance, it is entirely consistent with taking internal consistency to be necessary
for accepting a theory on the grounds that internal consistency is necessary for truth. Indeed, in this case
we are attaching a great deal of value to truth; this is what I have in mind by the lexical priority of truth,
discussed below. This way of using “value” differs somewhat from Douglas (2009, 94-5), though not so
much from Douglas (2013). See also note 12. I thank several readers, including an anonymous reviewer at
Synthese, for encouraging me to clarify my use of “truth” and “truth as a value.”
2. I use such terms as “hypotheses,” “theories,” “models,” and “accounts” roughly interchangeably
throughout this paper, and take no position in the debates over the syntactical and semantic views or the
status and role of models.
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(2) An epistemic phase, during which hypotheses are evaluated in terms of their rela-
tionship to empirical evidence, among other things, and accepted or rejected.
(3) A post-epistemic phase, during which accepted hypotheses are utilized in other
research (whether to produce more knowledge or new technology or both); this
phase also includes the impacts of the accepted hypotheses on the broader society.
The distinction between the pre-epistemic and epistemic phases seems to be descended
from the classical distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification, without
the problematic assumption that the subject of philosophy of science is coextensive with
the context of justification; Kitcher, for one, uses the “context of” locution. Accepting
and rejecting a hypothesis, in the epistemic phase, is often taken to be a strong and
“purely epistemic” attitude, one that does not (or should not) depend in any way on
the anticipated applications of the hypothesis (in the post-epistemic phase). Compare
Hugh Lacey’s distinction between acceptance and endorsement: acceptance belongs to
the epistemic phase, but endorsement belongs to the post-epistemic phase (2005a, 980,
986-7). The post-epistemic phase includes not only what we might call the direct impacts
of the accepted hypotheses (for example, their use in some piece of technology) but also
their indirect impacts (for example, the social impacts of the use of this technology) and
cultural impacts (for example, the hypotheses might reinforce stereotypes about certain
social groups or challenge widely-accepted religious beliefs).
Note that I work with this taxonomy in this paper because the approaches that I
discuss in §§3-5 generally assume it, but I do not accept it myself. As the terminology
suggests, these phases are usually construed linearly or progressively, with well-defined
boundaries between them. But often this is an oversimplification, and indeed in §5 I
will argue that in some important cases the phases cannot be sharply distinguished:
one action, described one way, is epistemic; but described another way, is pre-epistemic.
In a classic paper, Kathleen Okruhlik argued that the evaluation of hypotheses, the
epistemic phase, is often deeply influenced by both the way in which the hypotheses
were generated in the pre-epistemic phase and the expected ways in which it will be
utilized in the post-epistemic phase (1994). In recent work, Matthew Brown (2011, 2012)
and Kevin Elliott (2012) have emphasized that the actual relationship among these phases
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is highly nonlinear, and Daniel McKaughan has pointed out the importance to scientific
practice of attitudes other than acceptance and rejection (McKaughan 2007; Elliott and
McKaughan 2009).
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the philosophical debate had come to focus
on the epistemic phase and what is often (somewhat imprecisely) called “the ideal of
value-free science.” As I define the positions in the debate at that point in time, isola-
tionism is the view that ethical and political values may not legitimately influence the
standards for acceptance and rejection in this phase. Note that this is a vague evaluative
claim: that values shouldn’t have this influence, or that it’s bad, wrong, or vicious if
they do. “Influence” is also vague; there are many ways in which values might influence
the epistemic phase. Roughly, isolationism can accept that ethical and political values
make a difference to whether the scientific community uses these standards; as Lacey
puts it, “[t]he social process has been shaped and institutionally nurtured so that it is
conducive to producing soundly accepted theories” (Lacey 2005a, 981-2). Isolationism
cannot accept ethical and political values making a difference to the content of these
standards; the standards for acceptance and rejection should “not [be] grounded in the
social or moral value of a theory, its potential to be applied to further human flourishing,
a conception of the good society, or privileged economic interests” (Lacey 2005a, 980;
compare Lacey 1999, 67ff, 224-5; Kindcaid, Dupré, and Wylie 2007, 13ff; Douglas 2009,
45, 180 n8; Betz 2013, 1).3
By contrast with isolationism, transactionism is the view that some ethical and po-
litical values may legitimately influence the epistemic phase of scientific inquiry — that
is, they may legitimately make a difference to the content of the standards of acceptance
and rejection. Note that this is the simple negation of isolationism, and strictly implies
only that some values may have a legitimate influence, and perhaps only in some ways.4
Much of the philosophical debate between isolationism and transactionism has focused
3. I thank an anonymous reviewer at Synthese for pushing me to present the terminology in this section
more precisely.
4. Since isolationism and transactionism are defined in terms of specifically “ethical and political”
values, for the sake of presentation I often simply abbreviate this as “values.” In §4, where I focus on the
distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values, I am more careful about this.
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on underdetermination arguments, and so many philosophers who are not specialists in
science and values are most familiar with this part of the literature.
It is not clear to what extent anyone ever endorsed an “anything-goes” version of
transactionism, that is, a view that any influence of values on hypothesis-acceptance,
in any way, is legitimate. Sociologists and historians who explicitly advocated “rela-
tivism” and “symmetry” often clearly adopted these as methodological commitments for
descriptive rather than normative or evaluative projects (see, for example Barnes and
Bloor 1982, 23). On the other hand, they also often argued explicitly for much stronger
normative (or perhaps meta-normative) claims: “[f]or the relativist there is no sense at-
tached to the idea that some standards or beliefs are really rational as distinct from
merely locally accepted as such” (27). Rorty’s ironism (1991) and Feyerabend’s method-
ological anarchism (1993) superficially support “anything-goes” views, but arguably both
presuppose liberal assumptions (in the political philosophy sense) about autonomy and
“unencumbered selves” (Sandel 1998; MacIntyre 2006; Biddle 2009). And the strong
political commitments of feminism have always given the views of feminist scientists
and philosophers robust normative content (Okruhlik 2004; Wylie and Nelson 2007). In
any case, I am not aware of any contemporary philosopher of science who defends an
“anything-goes” view.
In the first few years of the twenty-first century, a combination of the mainstreaming
of feminist philosophy of science in North America — exemplified by Helen Longino’s
move to Stanford University — and Heather Douglas’ recovery and extension of the
inductive risk argument (Douglas 2000, 2009) — developed by William James (Magnus
2013) and, later, Carl Hempel and Richard Rudner — precipitated a rapid move away
from isolationism, even by philosophers who had previously been among its staunch
defenders (compare Kitcher 2001, ch. 3, with Kitcher 2011, §4; Hugh Lacey remains
an important advocate of isolationism; see the discussion of impartiality in Lacey and
Mariconda 2012). Consequently, specialists in science and values have generally shifted
their attention from general arguments over isolationism and transactionism as such and
to the specific problem of sorting out the legitimate and illegitimate ways in which values
could influence science, especially in the epistemic phase.
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In §2, I make this more specific problem more concrete by introducing two case
studies, one in which the influence of values on the epistemic phase was legitimate and
one in which it was illegitimate. Then in §§3-5 I examine three major sets of conceptual
tools developed in part to address this problem.5 I show how they can be used to analyze
the two cases, but argue that their analyses are inadequate. Finally, in §6, I present my
own approach.
2. Two cases of science and values
2.1. Feminism. Consider first the feminist case: the influence of feminism on such sci-
ences as embryology, archaeology, and anthropology since the 1970s. The literature on
the influence of feminism on science is vast, and “feminism” itself is understood in dif-
ferent ways by different writers. I will focus here on the work of self-identified feminist
scientists in archaeology, as analyzed by historian Londa Schiebinger and philosopher
Alison Wylie.
Wylie points out that, while feminist critiques in archaeology date back only to
1984 and “a number of those currently active in the area disavow any explicitly feminist
commitments” (Wylie 2001, 23-4), there is “widespread interest in the archaeology of
gender” and “much of the research done under the rubric of the archaeology of gender
embodies at least a minimal commitment . . . . to take women and gender seriously that
has resulted in contributions to archaeology that are changing its practice, its research
agenda, and its understanding of the cultural past” (25, 29). That is, while relatively
few archaeologists identify themselves as feminists, archaeology has been influenced in
significant ways by feminism and feminist critique.
A significant example for Wylie is Patty Jo Watson and M.C. Kennedy’s criticisms in
the 1980s and 1990s of then-dominant accounts of the development of agriculture. On
these accounts, women were responsible for gathering plants prior to the development of
agriculture and cultivating domesticated varieties after the development of agriculture,
5. To be clear, I don’t think that these three sets of tools are mutually exclusive. While the second and
third — the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values and the distinction between direct
and indirect roles for values, respectively — seem to be taken as rivals by their proponents, both involve
the first, which is an assumption that Matthew Brown calls the lexical priority of evidence and which I
generalize as the lexical priority of truth.
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but men were taken to be responsible for domestication and the development of agri-
culture itself. Watson and Kennedy pointed out a number of problematic androcentric
assumptions and incoherences in these accounts, including (a) the assumption that the
shamans (or the agents in other models) were men; and, correspondingly, that foragers
and food preparers were women, (b) that “dabbling for ritual purposes would be more
likely to produce the knowledge . . . necessary for horticulture” than the activities of for-
agers and food preparers, and (c) that the explanation “remove[s] women from the one
realm that is traditionally granted them, as soon as innovation or invention enters the
picture,” and so is ad hoc (Wylie 2002, 193).
In her analysis, Schiebinger emphasizes the mutually-supporting relationships be-
tween the gender structure of archaeology, standards of evidence and background as-
sumptions, and rival hypotheses of human origins. Women in archaeology are channeled
away from positions that “require active, exploratory, out-of-doors, dominant, manage-
rial, and risk-taking work” and, when they work on stone tools, “typically study” not
arrowheads and other weapons but “flake stone tools and other informal instruments
found on house floors, at base camps, and in village sites” (Schiebinger 1999, 141, 142).
But “men in the field have defined as interesting only a small range of tools, [weapons]
. . . that are celebrated as exemplifying Paleolithic life and are typically interpreted as
male innovations” (141). Then, this evidence is taken to support the “man-the-hunter”
hypothesis of human origins, according to which the hunting activities of men drove
major developments in human biological and cultural evolution. In other words, the
stone tools studied and assumed to be constructed and used by men are regarded as the
most important kind of evidence about Paleolithic human societies and “human origins,”
and used to support androcentric hypotheses; while evidence that might challenge these
androcentric hypotheses — such as stone tools assumed to be constructed and used by
women — are regarded as less important and studied primarily by women.
As I have argued more extensively elsewhere, the critical work of these feminist
archaeologists is both deeply feminist and deeply epistemological (Hicks 2012, §5.2). On
the one hand, they directly challenge androcentrism and misogyny (roughly, male dom-
inance) in several aspects of archaeological practice, including androcentric standards
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of evidence and explanatory frameworks and gendered hierarchies in the division of
labor and specializations within archaeology. On the other hand, the standards and
frameworks are epistemological criteria, that is, they are they standards used to eval-
uate hypotheses and proposed explanations for acceptance or rejection. Thus, when
feminist archaeologists challenge these standards and frameworks, they are challenging
the epistemological criteria of mainstream archaeology. And, to the extent that they
developed new and alternative standards and frameworks, they developed a new episte-
mology for archaeology. In short, not only did feminist archaeologists reject mainstream
archaeological accounts based, in part, on their feminist values; but also they challenged
the content of androcentric epistemological standards. Their challenges thus took place
squarely within the epistemic phase of inquiry.
2.2. Commercial Values. Consider next the pharmaceutical case: the influence of com-
mercial values on research publication and disclosures by the pharmaceutical industry.
Philip Mirowski and Robert Van Horn observe that, between the early 1980s and the
late 1990s, the structure of pharmaceutical research changed dramatically (Mirowski and
Van Horn 2005). Mirowski and Van Horn focus on the outsourcing of the research pro-
cess — in other words, the actual pharmaceutical development — to contract research
organizations or CROs, independent for-profit research firms contracted by pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers to work on particular clinical research projects (see also Ledford
2013). I focus here on the new communication technologies and new institutions of
command and control; specifically, I’m interested in the epistemic effects of the rise of
medical communications firms or MCFs, independent for-profit companies contracted by
pharmaceutical manufactures to prepare research reports and papers for publication.
Over the past decade, MCFs have received significant attention for their role in sev-
eral pharmaceutical ghostwriting controversies. For example, Carl Elliott reports that,
in a review of articles published on the antidepressant Zoloft between 1998 and 2000,
“the ghostwritten and agency-prepared articles outnumbered the articles written in the
traditional way. Forty-one ‘traditionally authored articles on Zoloft had been published,
while fifty-five articles had come from [MCF] Current Medical Directions” (C. Elliott
2004, 19). In a pair of papers, Jureidini, McHenry, and Mansfield (2008; 2008) closely
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examined the way in which GlaxoSmithKlein manipulated the interpretation of research
data in a peer-reviewed publication on its antidepressant Paxil. And Berenson (2005),
Biddle (2007), and Ross et al. (2008), discuss ghostwriting in another major pharma-
ceutical scandal, rofecoxib (Vioxx), a painkiller produced by Merck and withdrawn from
the market in 2004 based on evidence that it caused heart attacks. Both the Paxil
and Vioxx cases involved the MCF Scientific Therapeutics Information, and will be dis-
cussed in more detail below. And in 2010, Nature reported that “between 1997 and
2003, [MCF] DesignWrite oversaw the publication of dozens of peer-reviewed articles,
conference abstracts and posters on HRT [Hormone Replacement Therapy], receiving
up to US$25,000 per project [from the manufacturer]” (Callaway 2010; for a detailed
discussion of this case, see Fugh-Berman 2010).
Sergio Sismondo observes that “Visible experts are needed [by MCFs] for their au-
thority and independence, not for the contents of their expertise. In the commercialized
science I describe here, published research is valued for its marketing potential” (Sis-
mondo 2009a, 193). Despite this, he offers two reasons for a sanguine assessment of the
effects of MCFs. First, “the planners are keenly attentive to scientific norms, because it is
only by meeting those norms that they can distinguish themselves from marketers, and
in so doing achieve their marketing goals” (193). In other words, writers at MCFs must
produce work of high epistemological quality in order to distinguish their contributions
from those of marketers. Second, because of “STS’s longstanding commitment to sym-
metry” and “canonical studies that have shown how science is choice laden,” research
done by CROs, written by MCFs, and funded from beginning to end by the pharma-
ceutical industry is “not different from other medical research, analysis, and writing”;
“Pharmaceutical company research, analysis, and writing results in knowledge” (193). In
other words, scientific research is always pervasively influenced by values, so there is
nothing wrong with commercial values as such influencing pharmaceutical research. (To
be clear, in a followup to a response by McHenry (2009), Sismondo clarifies that he is in
fact deeply concerned about conflicts of interest and the power that the pharmaceutical
industry exercises through CROs and MCFs (2009b).)
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Rather than giving a lengthy theoretical response to these arguments, I’ll present
two particular cases in which industry manipulation of peer-reviewed publications had
serious epistemic effects.
The first case comes from McHenry’s detailed work on an article published in
the Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry that reported
the results of a clinical trial of paroxetine (Paxil), an antidepressant manufactured by
SmithKline Beecham (now GlaxoSmithKline). McHenry carried out this analysis with
Jon Jureidini and Peter Mansfield (Jureidini, McHenry, and Mansfield 2008; McHenry
and Jureidini 2008). In brief, a professional writer at the MCF Scientific Therapeutics
Information was responsible for interpreting the results of the clinical trial and preparing
the drafts of the article (Jureidini, McHenry, and Mansfield 2008, 154). McHenry and
Jureidini argue that the writer’s interpretation was directed by SmithKline Beecham and
that the nominal authors — academic scientists — did not make make substantial con-
tributions to the article (156-8). While the results of the trial did not show that the drug
was effective, the results were presented in misleading and distorted ways that suggested
it was (156). Furthermore, as of August 2013, the article has been cited over 500 times,
and continues to be cited as positive evidence for the efficacy and safety of Paxil and
related antidepressants (Sung et al. 2013; Julious 2013; Jureidini, McHenry, and Mans-
field 2008, 160, 163). (For a similar analysis of another Paxil publication, again involving
Scientific Therapeutics Information, see Wadman 2011; Amsterdam and McHenry 2012.)
Ross et al. confine their attention to identifying the extent and structure of ghost-
writing and guest authorship in articles on Vioxx; they do not consider the epistemic
effects of ghostwriting. Berenson demonstrates these epistemic effects for one particular
article, which published Vioxx clinical trial data in the Annals of Medicine. According to
Jeffrey Lisse, the nominal lead author of the article, “Merck designed the trial, paid for
the trial, ran the trial” (quoted in Berenson 2005; Biddle 2007, 29). As Berenson reports,
during the trial, “eight people taking Vioxx suffered heart attacks or sudden cardiac
death, compared with just one taking naproxen,” yet the article “reported that [only] five
patients taking Vioxx had suffered heart attacks during the trial, compared with one tak-
ing naproxen” (Berenson 2005, my emphasis). Emails reprinted with Berenson’s report
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document an exchange between Merck executives, debating whether to classify the cause
of death in one of the unreported cases as a heart attack or unknown. Apparently neither
Lisse nor a committee of independent academics were informed about the unreported
cases. In short, ghostwriting enabled Merck executives to suppress unfavorable evidence
and thereby misrepresent a negative study as a neutral one. (Psaty and Kronmal (2008)
document another instance in which data about the risks of Vioxx were misrepresented
or suppressed by Merck, but do not connect it to an instance of ghostwriting.)
It seems clear that commercial values — profit-seeking — had a significant influ-
ence on the evaluation and acceptance of hypotheses concerning the efficacy and safety
of Paxil and Vioxx. However, the complex organization of the trial, writing, and publica-
tion process makes it quite difficult to identify the particular ways in which these values
influenced these evaluations, and which individuals might be held responsible for any
illegitimate influences. Nevertheless, we can observe their epistemic consequences: the
publication of false and misleading evidence, and the acceptance of hypotheses concern-
ing the efficacy and safety of Paxil and Vioxx by regulators, clinicians, and (indirectly)
patients who took these drugs. These, in turn, had consequences — probably some
beneficial, certainly some harmful — for the health and well-being of the patients.
2.3. Legitimate or illegitimate? We have before us two cases in which ethical and
political values influenced the epistemic phase of scientific inquiry. Are these influences
legitimate?
According to the isolationist, of course, in both cases the answer is no: any influence
of ethical or political values on the epistemic phase is illegitimate, and hence the influ-
ences in these cases are illegitimate. Another simple answer, from an “anything-goes”
relativist, would be yes: any influence of ethical or political values on the epistemic phase
is legitimate, including in these particular cases.
Neither of these simple answers is acceptable. Transactionists have given compelling
conceptual and empirical arguments against isolationism, often using examples such as
the feminist case. At the same time, isolationists have raised compelling worries about
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the unrestrained politicization or commercialization of scientific inquiry — worries of
the same kind as seen in the pharmaceutical case.6
We need a more sophisticated analysis of the two cases. Such an analysis might start
by noting that, in the feminist case, the values in question seemed to promote knowl-
edge production. The influence of feminist values led to more empirically adequate and
externally consistent theories, and a better explanatory framework. By contrast, in the
pharmaceutical case, the influence of commercial values seemed to frustrate knowledge
production. Regardless of the particular mechanism, they led to distortions, misrep-
resentations, and failures to adequately investigate relevant hypotheses. This more so-
phisticated answer might also point to the downstream effects of the influence of these
values in the broader society: the influence of feminism may have helped undermine an-
drocentrism and patriarchy, while the influence of commercial values led to unnecessary
deaths.
This sketch suggests that the influence of values in the feminist case was legitimate,
and the influence of values in the pharmaceutical case was illegitimate. However, it
is just a sketch. Over the next three sections, I will attempt to use tools developed
in the science and values literature to develop this sketch further. Two problems will
appear several times in this discussion. First, the analysis is often highly ambiguous or
indeterminate, especially in the pharmaceutical case. Whether the cases turn out to be
legitimate or not depend on things like what terms we use to describe the actions of the
scientists involved. Second, even when the analysis matches the preliminary assessment
given in the last paragraph, it relies on a problematic assumption that truth, as a good
or value, enjoys absolute priority over other goods or values.7 While this assumption
may be widely shared among scientists and academics, it is not so widely shared by, for
instance, representatives of the pharmaceutical industry. In light of these two problems,
I conclude that none of these tools are not adequate to the task at hand. In §6, I briefly
introduce my own set of tools and argue that they are more adequate to this task.
6. I do not have the space here to present two other analyses. One develops Robert Merton’s ethos of
science; for examples see Henk van den Belt (2010) and Hans Radder (2010a). Another points to the role
of deceit in the pharmaceutical case.
7. On my use of “truth as a value,” see note 1.
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3. Lexical priority of evidence
One way of trying to give an account of the differences between the two cases
appeals to an assumption that Matthew Brown calls the lexical priority of evidence to
values (2013c, 2013b; see also Anderson 2004). This assumption can be traced back to
responses to worries about relativism and wishful thinking. Isolationists often worry that
transactionism leads to “anything-goes” relativism or problems of wishful thinking. To
assuage these worries, transactionists often state explicitly that, on their view, ethical and
political values have a legitimate role to play only after evidence had done as much work
as it could. As Brown puts it, assuming an absolute or lexical priority of evidence to
values “guarantees that even in value-laden science, values do not compete with evidence
when the two conflict” (Brown 2013c, 2, 7). Contrapositively and in my terminology, when
values do override considerations of evidence, the influence of values on the epistemic
phase of inquiry is illegitimate.
The lexical priority of evidence gives us a seemingly-simple framework to analyze
the feminist and pharmaceutical cases. Taking the feminist case first, we can analyze
the epistemic contributions of feminists scientists into two kinds. First, as per Wylie’s
analysis, feminist scientists identified various androcentric assumptions in accounts of
the development of agriculture, and so showed that these values had influenced the
acceptance of these accounts. Insofar as these androcentric values did not compete with
or override considerations of evidence, this is compatible with the lexical priority of
evidence. But it also means that the evidence by itself is insufficient to determine or
rationally compel the acceptance of these accounts. Therefore, feminist scientists may
legitimately reject these accounts simply for the reason that they depend on androcentric
values, and in addition feminist scientists may legitimately develop rival accounts that
use feminist values in similar ways, so long as these values do not override considerations
of evidence.
Next, as Schiebinger pointed out, women and men in archaeology typically worked
with different sets of stone tools. Weapons, studied by men, were used to support the
man-the-hunter hypothesis; feminist scientists emphasized stone tools and other artifacts
used for things like food preparation in the village, and thereby expanded the range of
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evidence against which the man-the-hunter hypothesis had to be evaluated. With this
expanded evidence base, feminist scientists argued that the hypothesis was empirically
inadequate. This is the second kind of epistemic contribution. With both kinds, the
influence of feminist values did not override considerations of evidence; so they are
consistent with the lexical priority of evidence; and thus according to this analysis both
kinds of influence are legitimate.
Turn now to the pharmaceutical case. It is initially plausible to say that commercial
values ran roughshod over considerations of evidence, and so the influence of commer-
cial values here was illegitimate. However, consider more carefully the email exchange
between Merck scientists about how to classify the death of a patient, as reported by
Berenson. The autopsy listed the cause of death as Hypertensive Heart Disease, and
because the study was double-blind the Merck scientists did not know whether she was
taking Vioxx or the control. One of the scientists reasons that “[c]ommon things being
common,” the likely cause of death is a heart attack, but “[c]ertainly, it is not definitive”
and “[i]f it is easier to call this an unknown cause of death, I could be persuaded to say
that as well.” The other scientist responds that “the committee would not have said this
was [a heart attack] and I think this is the best way to go since it leaves the process in
place” (Berenson 2005). Due to the lack of context, it’s not clear exactly which committee
is meant; Berenson suggests but does not state outright that it is an outside committee
of academic researchers, responsible for reviewing case reports in such trials. Berenson
reports that this particular case was not sent to this committee.
All together, it seems that the classification of the cause of death in this patient’s
case was underdetermined by the available evidence, that is, the autopsy report: perhaps
it was a heart attack, but perhaps not. Therefore it is plausible to say that the Merck
scientists took the available evidence as far as it could go — they didn’t try to classify it
as kidney failure, for example — and subsequently but only subsequently were commercial
values used to classify the cause of death as unknown. Hence, it is plausible to judge
that commercial values did not override considerations of evidence, and therefore were
consistent with the lexical priority of evidence, and so were legitimate.
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On this analysis, we have two plausible readings of the pharmaceutical case, one
concluding that the influence was illegitimate and the other concluding that it was legit-
imate. The situation is even more difficult with other cases, for which we do not have
the fine-grained documentary evidence that Berenson has provided. As McHenry and
Jureidini put it, “What is not clear from the available documents is who was responsible
for the manipulation of the data. This is the risk of using a ghostwriter to prepare a
manuscript” (McHenry and Jureidini 2008, 156).
Even if we grant that commercial values ran roughshod over considerations of evi-
dence in the pharmaceutical case, the appeal to the lexical priority of evidence is prob-
lematic. To make this argument, I would like to shift the language slightly, from evidence
to truth.8 The lexical priority of evidence over (ethical and political) values, it seems,
assumes that one takes truth to be more important than the ethical and political values
in question. That is, only insofar as truth as a value takes priority over all other val-
ues. Certainly truth is valuable; but why is it so valuable that it enjoys absolute, lexical
priority over all other values?
Among academics, including scientists and philosophers, truth as a value might
be generally regarded as having lexical priority over other values (compare Douglas
2009, 95; Talisse 2010). But pharmaceutical industry representatives might take truth
to be only instrumentally valuable, that is, valuable only for the sake of other valuable
things. And they might not take truth to be intrinsically valuable, that is, valuable for
its own sake. For instance, they might think that true beliefs concerning the effects of
a drug are valuable only for the sake of making lots of money. Indeed, insofar as true
beliefs concerning these effects prevent making lots of money — because no one will use
the drug if they know that it’s dangerous and not very effective — the pharmaceutical
industry representatives might think that truth is bad, not good, and so truth should be
sacrificed for the sake of making lots of money. In short, they might take their profits to
enjoy priority over truth!
8. Recall from note 1 that I am not assuming any specific conception of truth, or even whether “truth” is
a more appropriate term than, say, “empirical adequacy”; and by “truth as a value” I mean truth regarded
as good and worth having (by us), whatever truth is as such.
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Consequently, the initial analysis of the pharmaceutical case — the pharmaceutical
case is illegitimate because truth should take priority to commercial values — has no
traction with these pharmaceutical industry representatives. They simply don’t accept
the major premise. I grant that this argument is persuasive to many academics. But,
without an argument for the lexical priority of truth, it will not be persuasive to many
other people.
One might try to argue that truth is valuable from an arbitrary perspective insofar
as truth is useful for achieving whatever aims that perspective might have. (This is one
way of reading Talisse’s views.) If you want gender equality, it helps to believe true things
about sex and gender; if you want to make a lot of money by selling drugs, it helps to
believe true things about what your drugs do. But, again, this is only to say that truth
has instrumental value. Thus, again, when there is a conflict between truth and the
aim in question — say, pharmaceutical industry profits — there is a pro tanto reason to
sacrifice truth.
Alternatively, one might argue that the internal perspective of science (and academia
more generally) is all the more scientists (and philosophers and other academics) should
care about.9 We might say that the pharmaceutical industry representatives are pro-
foundly misguided in their low evaluation of truth; or, alternatively, that pharmaceutical
industry representatives have a right to decide for themselves how (un)important truth
is for them. In either case, scientists should simply get on with their research — should
pursue truth — rather than waste time in interminable debate over the importance of
various values.
Except that, in its current institutional context, the pharmaceutical industry repre-
sentatives have enormous power over the pharmaceutical research that is actually carried
out. The ability of pharmaceutical researchers to simply get on with their research de-
pends on the support of the pharmaceutical industry representatives, and thus on the
expected profitability of this research. Pharmaceutical researchers cannot, as it were,
remain within the internal perspective of science; they must justify their research from
the external perspective of the pharmaceutical industry.
9. I thank Charles Pence for pressing this point.
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4. Epistemic and non-epistemic values
A second tool for trying to distinguish the influence of values in our two cases is the
distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values. The distinction was developed in
the late 1970s and early 1980s as a response to Kuhn’s underdetermination arguments
in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, including by Kuhn himself (Kuhn 1977; Mc-
Mullin 1983). Proponents of the distinction granted proponents of underdetermination
that there was a gap between evidence and hypothesis; but, they said, this gap should
be filled by such epistemic or “truth-promoting” values as explanatory power and sim-
plicity, rather than “non-epistemic” ethical and political values. Thus, while the letter
of the value-free ideal should be rejected, the spirit remained intact. In response, some
feminist philosophers of science argued that the distinction between epistemic and non-
epistemic values was not as sharp as it seemed, and that ethical and political values may
legitimately lead us to prefer some epistemic values to others (Rooney 1992; Longino
1995, 1996).
In some recent papers, Daniel Steel has further developed the epistemic/non-epistemic
distinction. Steel defines epistemic values as those that “promote the attainment of truth”
or “the acquisition of true beliefs” (Steel 2010, 17-8). Steel notes that whether something
is epistemic can be context dependent:
Internal consistency is a straightforwardly . . . epistemic value, since it is
a necessary condition for truth. Whether external consistency is an epis-
temic value, however, depends on the truthfulness of the accepted back-
ground beliefs. If those beliefs are significantly false (e.g., that the earth is
the center of the universe and is no more than 10,000 years old), then ex-
ternal consistency can be a major impediment to the attainment of truth.
(18, his parentheses)
To distinguish legitimate from illegitimate cases, Steel proposes what I will call his influ-
ence principle: “Influences of nonepistemic values on scientific inferences are epistemically
bad if and only if they impede or obstruct the attainment of truths” (15, my emphasis;
see also 25ff). In a subsequent paper with Kyle Powys Whyte, the principle is weakened
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slightly — to deal with such problems as unethical research designs — but retains the
basic idea: “nonepistemic values should not conflict with epistemic values in the de-
sign, interpretation, or dissemination of scientific research that is practically feasible and
ethically permissible” (Steel and Whyte 2012, 169).
Steel’s contextual understanding of epistemic values accommodates insights from
all of the thinkers cited in the first paragraph of this section. On the one hand, epistemic
values have a special role or function in accepting hypotheses, and the legitimate role of
non-epistemic values is limited by their relation to epistemic values. On the other hand,
consider a specific element of Longino’s argument against the epistemic/non-epistemic
distinction. She contrasts the traditional or mainstream value of simplicity with a fem-
inist value of “ontological heterogeneity,” which values complexity (1995, 392; 1996,
46-7). While simplicity leads to taxonomies with only a few different categories — such
as aggressive, domineering, promiscuous males and passive, submissive, coy females —
ontological heterogeneity leads taxonomies with a variety of different kinds of beings in
the world and variation among individuals — such as the wide variety of female and
male reproductive strategies. Steel’s account of epistemic values supports an argument
that simplicity and ontological heterogeneity are complementary epistemic values. Simplic-
ity will probably lead us to true broad generalizations, but also will probably lead us
to overgeneralize and miss exceptions; whereas ontological heterogeneity will probably
lead us to true claims about very specific groups, but also miss generalizations that do
indeed apply generally and for the most part. Thus, in contexts in which one value has
been promoted and the other has been neglected, we will tend to get certain kinds of
truths but miss others. The complementary value will then serve as a corrective, as it
were returning us to the virtuous mean between the vicious extremes. Recognizing this,
within the broader scientific community different groups of scientists may legitimately
(indeed, should) pursue research programs that emphasize one epistemic value over the
other, motivated (in part) by their respective ethical and political values, so long as in-
teractions between the groups ensure that the scientific community as a whole tends
towards truth. Stated less abstractly: in the feminist case, the influence of feminist sci-
entists, and so the influence of feminist values, corrected an overemphasis on simplicity,
thereby promoting the attainment of truths; hence it was epistemically good. Indeed, in
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this context, insofar as feminist values promoted the attainment of truth, they were both
epistemic and social-political values.
Obviously the analysis in the preceding paragraph can serve as a paradigm for
analyzing the feminist case: an overemphasis on simplicity, reductionism, and so on, was
impeding and obstructing the attainment of truths; feminist criticism led us away from
the vicious extreme and back to the virtuous, truth-promoting mean. So the influence of
feminist values was legitimate. This fits well with my preliminary sketch assessment of
this case.
Steel and Whyte provide a second paradigm in their analysis a study of environmen-
tal racism, a hypothesized connection between race and exposure to harmful pollution.
Their analysis begins by noting that Deborah Mayo’s severity principle — developed from
Popper — is an important epistemic value: “data xo do not provide good evidence for
hypothesis H if x0 result from a test procedure with a very low probability or capacity
of having uncovered the falsity of H (even if H is incorrect)” (Mayo and Spanos, quoted
in Steel and Whyte 2012, 168). They next argue that the particular environmental racism
study that they are analyzing indeed had a low capacity for uncovering the falsity of
the hypothesis that there is a strong correlation between race and pollution exposure,
assuming that it is actually false (177). Finally, since this study was funded by Waste
Management Inc., they conclude that non-epistemic commercial values could have led
to these conflicts with the epistemic value articulated by the severity principle. That is,
in this case there could have been a violation of the influence principle.
This second paradigm seems appropriate to the pharmaceutical case. Indeed, we
can even use the severity principle again. Recall that one of the main ways in which
commercial values had an influence in the pharmaceutical case was through the inter-
pretation of ambiguous data. Doing this decreases the capacity of the studies to uncover
the falsity of the hypotheses that the drugs in question are safe and effective, assuming
that these hypotheses are actually false. Thus, as in the environmental racism case,
commercial values seem to have overridden the epistemic value articulated by the sever-
ity principle. And so it seems there was a violation of the influence principle in the
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pharmaceutical case. As with the feminist case, this analysis seems to fit well with my
preliminary sketch assessment of the pharmaceutical case.
However, note that Steel’s influence principle only identifies cases where the influ-
ence is epistemically bad. This only implies that the influence is bad simpliciter insofar
as we assume something like the lexical priority of truth. Or, to be a bit more precise,
Steel must assume that the pursuit of truth enjoys lexical priority over such values as
pharmaceutical industry profits. But then the argument that I used against the lexical
priority of truth in the last section also applies here: Suppose the pharmaceutical in-
dustry representatives maintain that truth is less important than their profit margins.
Indeed, suppose they maintain that truth is valuable only insofar as truth promotes the
attainment of profit. Then, when truth impedes or obstructs the attainment of profit,
truth should be sacrificed. For all that the interpretation of data in the pharmaceutical
case was epistemically bad, it was profitable, and from this perspective profitability out-
weighs epistemic badness. Thus the actions of pharmaceutical industry scientists were,
from their perspective, entirely legitimate.
There is another, related problem. Steel and Whyte argue that their approach does
better than Heather Douglas’ direct/indirect role distinction — discussed in the next
section — in part because their approach recognizes distinctions between different kinds
of values, Douglas treats all values the same way (163-4). But Steel and Whyte distinguish
between only epistemic and non-epistemic values. Suppose that the pharmaceutical
industry scientists argued that their actions were justified not for the sake of profits but
instead of the sake of promoting the health of patients (compare 171): interpreting a
small number of ambiguous cases in the way that they did enabled them to bring to
market sooner drugs that could be immensely beneficial to large numbers of people.
In this version of the pharmaceutical case, the conflict is between epistemic values and
the non-epistemic value of patient health; the violation of the influence principle is
otherwise exactly the same as in the original version of the case. Yet I suspect that
many people who think balancing epistemic values against profitability is easy — profits
should be sacrificed — would find it much more difficult to balance epistemic values
against patient health, and might even say that it is good all things considered to do so
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in some cases. That is, minimally, for the purpose of deciding whether the sacrifice
of some epistemic values was good or bad all things considered, it is plausible to think
that there are relevant differences between the non-epistemic values of profit and patient
health. Thus, because it is not sensitive to differences among kinds of non-epistemic
values, the influence principle returns the judgment that a sacrifice of epistemic values
was epistemically bad even in cases in which it was plausibly good all things considered.
Finally, since the practical question is always “what shall we do, all things considered?” it
is at least unclear whether the influence principle can provide practical advice, as Steel
and Whyte think that it can (for example, at Steel and Whyte 2012, 167, 177).
As with the appeal to the lexical priority of evidence, the distinction between epis-
temic and non-epistemic values does not give us an adequate way to determine which
values are more important than others. We might, as Steel does, posit that epistemic
values are more important. But this at best begs the question against those who take
other values to be more important and it limits the ability of our philosophy of science
to provide practical advice.
5. Direct and indirect roles
In recent work, Heather Douglas has developed a distinction between direct and
indirect roles for values. “Values,” as Douglas uses the term, include ethical and political
values as well as such traditionally epistemic values as simplicity and explanatory power
(Douglas 2009, 89, 92ff). In the epistemic phase, if values were to play the direct role
then they would “act as reasons in themselves to accept a claim” and so “act much the
same way as evidence normally does”; in an indirect role, which “values . . . . deter-
mine the importance of the inductive gaps left by the evidence” (96) or set standards
for evidence — how much of what kinds of evidence is required to accept or reject a
hypothesis. On Douglas’ view, values may not legitimately play the direct role, and may
have a legitimate influence only in the indirect role (though they may legitimately play a
direct role in the pre- and post-epistemic phases; see 98ff).
In the next few paragraphs, I offer two readings of each of the pharmaceutical and
feminist cases. On the first readings, Douglas’ account matches our intuitions in §2:
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values are playing an illegitimate direct role in the pharmaceutical case, and a legitimate
indirect role in the feminist case. On the second readings, Douglas’ account seems
to reach exactly the opposite conclusions. My claim is not that Douglas’ account is
committed to one set of readings or the other. Rather, my point is that the analysis of
the two cases, using the distinction between direct and indirect roles and the evidence
available to us (about individuals’ intentions and so on), is ambiguous or inconclusive.
Note that I gave a similar argument against the lexical priority of truth in §3.
One very plausible reading of the pharmaceutical case is that commercial values
are playing an illegitimate direct role in the epistemic phase: that they are leading to
evidence being suppressed, ignored, or distorted. I grant that this reading is quite plau-
sible. But we might also read the pharmaceutical case as one in which commercial values
legitimately are leading to extreme standards of evidence — very, very low standards
for efficacy claims and very, very high standards for hazard claims. In the eyes of phar-
maceutical industry representatives, perhaps getting these pharmaceuticals to market as
fast as possible and selling them to as many people as possible is much, much more
important than the risk of making errors about side effects or effectiveness. At least
from their perspective, the risk of reduced profits — or having to scrap the drug entirely,
wasting millions of dollars and dozens of researcher-years — outweighed other risks, and
so they established a low standard of evidence for claims about side effects and effec-
tiveness and interpreted ambiguous cases in favorable ways. Recall from the Vioxx case
again that the heart attack victim case was classified as an “unknown cause of death”
because that “leaves the process in place” and “[doesn’t] raise concerns” (Berenson 2005;
compare Douglas 2000, §5, 569-72). The scientists would have classified this case as a
heart attack, but only if the evidence had been much more substantial or unambiguous
than it actually was. On this reading, the evidence was uncertain about how these cases
should be classified, and commercial values played only an indirect role. They would
therefore seem to be legitimate. (For a somewhat similar example, see Steel and Whyte
2012, especially 170-3.)
As for the feminist case, one plausible reading is that feminist values played an
entirely legitimate indirect role, in that feminists’ suspicions of androcentrism and other
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forms of bias led them to demand much more and better evidence for androcentric
theories. But it is also plausible to think that feminist values played an illegitimate direct
role, in that feminists rejected andorcentric theories simply because these theories were
androcentric.
Consider the following sketch of a narrative of feminist archaeology: Prior to the
1980s, the almost-all-male researchers in archaeology had an accepted set of methods,
explanatory frameworks, broad theories, specific hypotheses, and so on. Many of these
theories were androcentric. As a generation of women entered the field, many of them
had feminist commitments; these commitments led them to be suspicious about these
sexist and androcentric accepted theories. Their research eventually produced robust
and influential criticisms, undermining evidence, alternative theories, and so on. Often
the old methods were inconsistent with other methods, the old explanatory frameworks
were empirically inadequate, and the most sexist and androcentric background assump-
tions were undermined by the tides of social change.
In this narrative sketch, the epistemic phase — the acceptance or rejection of theo-
ries — occurs at least three times:
(1) In the acceptance of the earlier/sexist or androcentric theories by prior genera-
tions of researchers.
(2) In the rejection of these theories by the generation of feminist researchers.
(3) In the widespread acceptance of the new, non- or less-sexist or -androcentric
theories by the peers of the feminist researchers or the following generations of
researchers.
It may be possible to read the first and third times as values legitimately setting stan-
dards of evidence: sexist values set low standards of evidence for sexist or androcentric
theories; later, feminist values placed higher standards of evidence for sexist or andro-
centric theories, and lower standards for more egalitarian theories. However, the second
time occurred before there was much systematic evidence to undermine the accepted
theories. This is not to say that there was no such evidence; feminist scientists pointed
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to undermining evidence in making their case that the accepted theories should be re-
jected. But, by and large, the rejection of the accepted theories was based primarily on
feminist values. Only subsequently, after rejecting the accepted theories, did feminist
scientists systematically accumulate the significant evidence that eventually undermined
the earlier theories in the eyes of the broader scientific community. As Wylie puts it,
two feminist archaeologists “commissioned a series of pilot projects on gender that they
hoped might demonstrate the potential of research along the lines proposed by Conkey and
Spector 1984” (Wylie 2002, 189, my emphasis). Thus, by Douglas’ lights, it would seem
that the earlier influence of sexist values was indirect, and thus legitimate; but, at least
initially, the influence of feminist values was direct, and thus illegitimate.
All together, Douglas’ account seems to be ambiguous: we may read the influence
of values in either case as legitimate or illegitimate.
It may be objected that I have not produced the kind of empirical, historical support
that the problematic readings require. How do I know that feminists archaeologists
rejected the androcentric theories merely because they were androcentric? How do I know
that pharmaceutical industry scientists carefully limited the role of commercial values to
setting standards of evidence?
But these questions actually support my point. I don’t know these things. And
neither does the objector, or indeed anyone else. At best, Douglas’ account seems to
indicate that we should reserve judgment about whether these cases were legitimate or
illegitimate until we have much, much more evidence. We must carefully sort out the
different phases of the research process and examine the researchers’ intentions and
reasoning. Who made which decisions about classifying the death of the Vioxx patient?
Who decided how to interpret the Paxil trial data? What role did evidence play in their
deliberations? In exactly what ways did commercial values come into play? And so on.
Yet the pharmaceutical case seems to me to be clearly and egregiously illegitimate. I
suggest that gathering additional evidence will not change our basic evaluation of these
cases (e.g., that something has gone very wrong in the pharmaceutical case), though they
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might change our understanding of important details or our assessment of responsibil-
ity.10 Indeed, gathering some of these pieces of evidence will simply be impossible. Does
this mean that we must reserve judgment forever? Not only is that impractical, it also
conflicts with the ease with which we made judgments about these cases in §2.
Alternatively, it may be objected that the rejection of the accepted methods in the
feminist case was part of a pre-epistemic, not epistemic, phase. That is, one might argue
that the feminist scientists were choosing a research program (to challenge the doxastic
status quo), not taking an epistemic attitude (rejection or non-acceptance) or challenging
the standards for acceptance and rejection. Since choosing a research program is part of
the pre-epistemic phase, and the direct role for values is legitimate in the pre-epistemic
phase, the influence of feminist values here was entirely legitimate.
However, it seems to me that these three possibilities — “choosing this research
program,” “taking the epistemic attitude of rejection,” and “challenging the epistemic
standards” — are three descriptions of one and the same activity (for a similar point,
see Elliott and McKaughan 2009). Insofar as the feminist scientists were choosing a
research program that challenged the status quo, they were rejecting the claims that con-
stituted that status quo, judging them to be inadequately supported or even undermined
by the evidence; and insofar as they were judging the claims to be inadequately sup-
ported by the evidence, they were challenging the standards of what counted as good,
support-lending evidence. It may be useful for philosophy of science to make conceptual
distinctions among pre-, post-, and epistemic phases of scientific for certain analytic
purposes, such as mathematical treatments of the relationship between evidence and
hypothesis. That is, these taxonomies may be useful as Galilean idealizations of science
itself (McMullin 1985). But these phases are often entangled, inseparable, or even con-
ceptually indistinguishable in actual scientific practice. As the feminist case shows, what
seems to be the epistemic phase under one description can be the pre-epistemic phase
under another, equally good description.
10. The Knobe Effect suggests that the value we assign to the consequences of the Paxil trial will
influence our assessment of the role of commercial values in the researchers’ intentions and reasoning,
and so our assessment of the case according to Douglas’ account. Specifically, the effect predicts that we,
insofar as we take these consequences to be bad, we will probably say that the researchers intended to
bring them about (Knobe 2003). And it is reasonable to interpret this as an illegitimate direct role for
values in the epistemic phase. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.
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The distinction among pre-, post-, and epistemic phases is like a frictionless plane:
useful for some analytic purposes, but often not straightforwardly applicable to the
concrete complexities of the real world. Specifically, in the pharmaceutical and especially
the feminist cases, it seems to be a source of more confusion than clarification. But
Douglas’ account of legitimate and illegitimate influences of values depends entirely on
this distinction: direct influences are legitimate pre- and post-, but not in the epistemic
phase. Thus, like the other two approaches, Douglas’ approach does not support an
adequate account of the two cases.
6. Conclusion: A New Direction
In the preceding sections, I have examined three major conceptual tools developed
in the science and values literature for distinguishing legitimate and illegitimate influ-
ences of ethical and political values. I have argued that that none is adequate to this
task. In this final section, I will begin to develop the sketch given at the end of §2 using
my own approach. This approach draws heavily on work in ethics, especially by Aristotle
(1984), John Dewey (1988), Philippa Foot (1972), Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, ch. 14), Henry
Richardson (1994), and Elizabeth Anderson (2005/2008). I will suggest that it avoids
the problems faced by the other approaches, including analytical ambiguities, failing to
distinguish different kinds of non-epistemic values, and the lexical priority of truth.
Recall from the end of §2 the observation that, at least in the particular cases at
hand, the influence of commercial values frustrated the epistemic aims of science —
in a word, truth — while the influence of feminist values promoted these aims. Put
more generally, from the scientific perspective, in the pharmaceutical case constitutive
values of science and contextual values from the pharmaceutical industry are mutually
antagonistic, while in the feminist case the constitutive and contextual values are mu-
tually synergistic.11 Hence, from this perspective, the influence of commercial values in
the pharmaceutical case was illegitimate, while the influence of feminist values in the
feminist case was legitimate.
11. The terminology of constitutive and contextual values is due to Longino (1990, 4ff), and these
concepts have not enjoyed much further development in recent years. An anonymous reviewer suggests
that Kitcher’s account of broad, cognitive, and probative values is a development of Longino’s concepts
(Kitcher 2011, 37-9; see also Brown 2013a).
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Thus far, the approach sounds very much like Steel’s use of the epistemic/non-
epistemic distinction. However, there are two important differences. First, on my ap-
proach the constitutive values of science include but are not limited to “purely epistemic”
values, such truth (narrowly construed) or empirical adequacy. Other constitutive values
of science include practical knowledge, or know-how, and the development of socially
useful technology (Baird 2004; Cartwright 2006; Tuana 2012; Brown 2012; Douglas,
forthcoming; and arguably also Kitcher 2011). Likewise, on my approach, a “purely
epistemic” attitude of acceptance is not more important than a pragmatic attitude of
endorsement. This first feature makes it possible for my approach to recognize some
synergies that Steel’s does not. For example, in some cases commercial values might
promote the development of socially useful pharmaceuticals; since the latter is one of
the constitutive values of biomedical scientific research, in these cases the constitutive
and contextual values are mutually synergistic.12
The other important difference with the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction relates
to the qualification “from the scientific perspective” the lexical priority of truth. My
criticisms of this priority can be understood as recognizing that other groups of people,
such as the pharmaceutical industry, have their own constitutive values, and from their
perspectives the various values of scientific research are contextual. Specifically, truth is
of paramount importance from the scientific perspective, yet it is much less important
than the constitutive value of profit from the pharmaceutical industry perspective.
Despite being tied to particular perspectives, these claims still have evaluative force,
at least (though perhaps not only) for the individuals who inhabit those perspectives.
Specifically, evaluative claims based on the constitutive values of the scientific perspec-
tive have evaluative force for scientists, while evaluative claims based on the constitutive
values of the pharmaceutical industry have evaluative force for individuals within this
12. Up to this point in the paper, I have generally used “values” because it is the term used in the
literature that I am discussing, viz., the “science and values” literature. However, my approach is better
put in the language of various goods, which are the aims or ends or goals of various activities or social
practices. Some of these goods are the constitutive aims of these activities; for example, truth and useful
technology are two goods that are among the constitutive aims of the activity of scientific inquiry. For the
sake of continuity with the rest of this paper, in the text I will stick with “values,” though occasionally this
makes for some awkward phrasing. Compare the language of this note with Longino 1990, 17-9.
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industry. In this way, evaluation and normativity start from the commitments and in-
teractions of some particular people engaged in some particular collaborative activities,
rather than from universally-binding fundamental principles (MacIntyre 1984, ch. 14;
Rouse 2007). This may be thought problematic; unfortunately, I do not have sufficient
space here to take up that problem. For an argument that this kind of approach need
not collapse into a pernicious relativism, see MacIntyre (2006).
My analysis of the feminist case is straightforward. The interaction with science in
this case helped promote feminist values — something like undermining androcentric
ideology — and so was legitimate. Note that this judgment is particular to the case: in
cases in which science is antagonistic to or frustrates the pursuit of feminist values, fem-
inists will be at least much more skeptical about interacting with science. (For example,
the relationship between feminism and evolutionary psychology is much more fraught;
see Fehr 2012.) In addition, we do not need to carefully inspect feminist scientists’ inten-
tions or subjective reasoning processes to identify the synergy (or antagonism) between
scientific and feminist constitutive values. In the 1980s it may have been controversial
whether feminist values were synergistic or antagonistic to scientific values. For example,
isolationist archaeologists may have worried that feminists were illegitimately trying to
impose a partisan political agenda or “political correctness” on archaeology. But, in line
with the analyses of the feminist case in §§3 and 4, feminist scientists could claim that
their approach had the potential to be more empirically adequate, broaden the set of
available evidence, correct an overemphasis on simplicity, and in general promote the
constitutive values of scientific inquiry. Therefore their work should be given a chance
to realize this potential, and in retrospect we can say that it did. Thus, the analysis of
the feminist case is not ambiguous.
The pharmaceutical case is more complicated. On my approach, rather than start-
ing with the constitutive values of science — assuming the lexical priority of truth —
we should start with the constitutive values of the pharmaceutical industry. It seems
that profit is one such value. But another such value is the health and well-being of
the industry’s consumers/patients. We thus have at least three values in play: profit,
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patient health, and contextual values (from the industry’s perspective) coming from sci-
ence. While industry representatives might attempt to claim that the interactions among
these three are synergistic, it seems clear that, at least in the particular cases I presented
in §2, the pursuit of profit is antagonistic to both patient health and scientific values.
It therefore seems to be necessary to sacrifice certain of these values for the sake
of others. I would argue first that profit is strictly instrumentally valuable — valuable
only for the sake of spending it on other things, not for own sake — while health is
both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable. Indeed, on the plausible assumption that
constitutive values must be intrinsically valuable, it follows that profit is not actually a
constitutive value of health care. Instead, it is merely part of the institutional apparatus
by which we provision health care. In other words, the profit motive is merely the way
in which our market system gets people (or tries to get people) to provide health care,
develop new pharmaceuticals, and so on, all for the sake of promoting health. Profit is
merely a means and health is the intrinsically valuable, constitutive end.
But this last point implies from the perspective of the pharmaceutical industry that it is
wrong to sacrifice patient health for the sake of profit, as happened in the pharmaceu-
tical case. By contrast, while scientific values are contextual and thus perhaps strictly
instrumentally valuable (again, from the perspective of the pharmaceutical industry),
promoting them would have been a more effective way to promote the constitutive value
of patient health. So we can conclude that from the perspective of the pharmaceutical in-
dustry it was wrong to sacrifice scientific values for the sake of profit in the pharmaceutical
case. As with the feminist case, this analysis does not depend on in-principle unavailable
evidence about the intentions or subjective reasoning processes of industry scientists.
Nor does it depend on how we describe their actions.
Note three features of this approach. First, it recognizes on the lexical priority of
truth and the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction, insofar as scientists accept them, but
in ways that avoid the problems I identified with them above. Second, it uses an ethical
framework rather than an epistemological one, and specifically ideas about practical
reasoning in contexts where there are specific values or goals. Thus, by design and
in contrast with some points I made about Steel’s approach, my approach supports
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distinctions among various kinds of non-epistemic values and is immediately relevant to
the practical question “what shall we do, all things considered?”
Third, my approach brings together both epistemological and ethical issues. Philoso-
phers of science have done excellent work on the epistemological aspects of values in
science. And some ethicists have begun to examine the ethical issues raised by com-
mercialized science (Resnik 2010). But the problem of distinguishing legitimate and
illegitimate influences of ethical values in science is both ethical and epistemological,
and indeed I think we must consider interactions between the ethical and epistemological
aspects of the problem. This requires juxtaposing these issues in ways that cannot be
done within one philosophical specialization or the other.
The presentation of my approach here must be limited to the bits and pieces that I
have offered in this section. But I do believe I have given good reason to expect it to be
more promising than the other approaches that I have examined.
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